October 18, 2001

MEMORANDUM TO: OPINION LEADERS

FROM: TOM DONNELLY, Deputy Executive Director

SUBJECT: China

“The sanctions remain in place.” Those five words, spoken yesterday by White House press aide Ari Fleisher, might prove to be as important as any policy adopted by the Bush Administration during the entire “war on terrorism.” In refusing to sell spare parts for China’s fleet of U.S.-made Black Hawk helicopters -- a sale prohibited by sanctions imposed after the Tienanmen massacre in 1989 -- President Bush has indicated that he is not ready to compromise larger strategic goals to win the war against terrorists and rogue states in the Middle East.

The rejection of the sale also sends an important message as the president arrives at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum meeting in Shanghai. Tomorrow’s joint press conference with Jiang Zemin is Bush’s first meeting with the Chinese leader, and comes as Jiang is about to give up much of his power and the tricky process of succession in Beijing begins in earnest. The temptation will be to reward Jiang for his “assistance” in the current war on terrorism or influence those who follow him by promoting a new era of good relations.

Despite yesterday’s spare-parts decision, the administration long has been divided about policy toward China. In the presidential campaign, Bush defined China as a “strategic competitor.” The Pentagon’s just-completed Quadrennial Defense Review speaks, in a thinly veiled reference to China, of the likelihood that “a military competitor with a formidable resource base will emerge” in East Asia. And the president has stated, in no uncertain terms, his willingness to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese strike. Yet, as the EP-3 affair and the limited sales of weapons to Taiwan showed, there are strong voices in the State Department and elsewhere in the administration opposed to confronting China.

Thus the president’s performance in Shanghai inevitably will be regarded in light of the divisions among his lieutenants and be seen as a measure of how much really has changed in international politics since September 11. There would be some marginal benefits, no doubt, in recruiting China to support the war against Osama bin Laden, the Taliban and others trying to drive the United States out of the Middle East. But China’s past behavior -- most notably its missile and other arms sales to Pakistan -- and strategic ambitions argue for caution. And America’s global leadership demands that the price of security in the Middle East not be paid by our allies and interests in East Asia.