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The plans of Prime Minister-elect Zapatero to bring Spanish troops home from Iraq present a huge challenge to the future of transatlantic relations. While Washington devotes itself to dealing with this crisis, another major disagreement would be unwelcome to say the least. Unfortunately, a conflict is emerging in transatlantic relations about China. Europe's courtship of China for trade purposes, like America's, is nothing new. However, European countries increasingly view the acquisition of influence in China as coming at America's expense. Jacques Chirac, for example seeks a "China in full growth and a united Europe" as a counterbalance to American power. Seen in those terms, recent European overtures toward Beijing have serious long-term implications, and quite possibly dangerous consequences in the near future. Take Taiwan. As voters there prepare to cast ballots Saturday for president and referenda on defending against the Chinese threat, French warships are engaged in naval exercises under the command of China's People's Liberation Army. Meanwhile, on shore, the E.U. foreign affairs chief, Javier Solana, visited Beijing as part of an effort to end the E.U.'s arms embargo, the last remaining sanction imposed after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. Mr. Solana's mission? To finesse Brussels's lifting of the embargo so as to - in his words - "contribute to the better of the relationship between the European Union and China and at the same time not contribute to the increasing of weapons in the region, but contribute to the stability of the region." At first glance, these overtures may seem repellant, but inconsequential. America, not Europe, is the leading power in Asia. Washington's relations with Tokyo, Seoul, and Canberra set the agenda, and American troops - not French, British, or Germans - guarantee security in the region. In fact, even President Chirac implicitly made European irrelevance a justification for lifting the embargo, asserting, "it's obviously not likely to change the strategic balance of power." The belief that Europe cannot complicate American security interests may be reassuring, but the reality is otherwise. Pentagon studies say the balance of forces in the Taiwan Strait will begin to tilt in Beijing's favor as early as next year. European willingness to contribute to Taiwan's vulnerability, and put its weapons used against American forces defending Taiwan raises another issue. Where else might the E.U. be willing to advance China's regional military and political influence? As the saying goes, you can't beat something with nothing. While working to persuade the E.U. not to lift its embargo, Washington needs to enlist Europe in an alternate vision for Asia that emphasizes the common interest in an Asia dominated by democracies, not dictatorships. President Bush has hinted at such a project, speaking approvingly of a "fellowship of free Pacific nations...as strong and united as our Atlantic partnership." While America has played the leading role in post-War II Asia, under a web of bilateral relationships, European's NATO experience would be invaluable in a security alliance of democracies stretching from New Delhi to Tokyo. Before any of this can happen, America needs a realistic China policy. The Bush administration boasts the best U.S.-China relations in 30 years, even while trying to cope with its obstructionist tactics in the North Korea nuclear talks. The president gave China a pass on the democracy imperative he outlined in his speech at the National Endowment for Democracy last November, while the State Department has spent the past year criticizing Beijing for rights abuses, including arrests of democracy activists. America itself engages in military cooperation with China, but claims, according to one official, "we don't do anything operational, and everything we do is circumscribed by law so as to prevent China from gaining knowledge of advanced Western military tactics and procedures." Nevertheless, it is extremely hard to persuade allies not to sell weapons to a country that Secretary of State Powell calls a "real friend." Even if Washington sorts out its China policy, the conflict between American and Europe may run deeper and be much harder to solve. European leaders' competitive nature coupled with Realpolitik instincts will continue to cause problems, says Jeffrey Gedmin, an American who directs the Aspen Institute Berlin. "China has this huge market, is a nuclear power, maintains its permanent seat on the Security Council. In Europe, Realpolitik trumps Moralpolitik nearly every time." With Asia fast becoming the region of greatest strategic concern, America had better ensure China is one of the exceptions to that rule.
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