April 20, 1998

MEMORANDUM TO: OPINION LEADERS

FROM: GARY SCHMITT

SUBJECT: U.S.- China Policy

Having fought off all challenges on trade, proliferation, and human rights issues, the Clinton Administration is firmly in control of U.S. policy toward China. Before Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's visit to Beijing next week, and the subsequent trip by the president in June, it is reasonable to ask what the results of the administration's policy have been to date.

China and Non-proliferation: Despite China's poor non-proliferation record, President Clinton certified in mid-January that China was a reliable partner with which the U.S. could exchange sensitive nuclear technology. The certification was tied to China's assurances that it would no longer assist Iran with its nuclear program. Administration spokesmen highlighted the agreement as the key policy accomplishment of the October summit. Within weeks, however, Chinese government-controlled entities were negotiating to sell Iran chemicals which could be used to help produce weapons-grade uranium.

China and Human Rights: After abandoning early in its first term the idea of using American economic power to advance freedom in China, the administration assured Congress that it would continue to press the issue of human rights in China through multilateral forums, such as the annual U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva. Ignoring both exiled dissident Wei Jingsheng's pointed reminder that the Chinese people see the Commission's work as a "barometer" by which to judge international backing for freedom in their country, and Senate and House support for a tough Commission resolution on China, the Clinton Administration in March gave up all pretense that it cared about human rights by announcing it would no longer sponsor a resolution in Geneva on China's human rights practices.

China and Hong Kong: As Hong Kong passed from British to Chinese rule last summer, Secretary of State Albright vowed the administration would be vigilant in watching whether Beijing kept its pledge of "one country, two systems." Since the July transfer, Beijing and its hand-picked administration in Hong Kong have disbanded the city's popularly-elected legislature, crafted a new electoral system that virtually guarantees that the new legislature will be controlled by pro-PRC political and business elites, imposed new limits on public demonstrations, and passed retroactive legislation exempting Beijing-based entities from a host of Hong Kong's laws. Nevertheless, according to the State Department's recent report to Congress on developments in Hong Kong, the transition from British to Chinese rule "has gone smoothly."

China and Taiwan: Seeking to move ties between the U.S. and China "forward," the Clinton Administration used a January trip to Taiwan by a group of former high-ranking national security officials to pressure the government of Taiwan to reopen talks with China. The message to democratic and free-market Taiwan was that it could not count on the U.S. to help it militarily if it insisted on permanent political independence from mainland China. Ignoring the fundamental question of whether it would be in America's geo-strategic interest for China to govern Taiwan, to say nothing of the principles of justice and self-determination, the administration has increased Taiwan’s isolation to the benefit of the People's Republic own ambitions in the region.

China and Technology Transfer: In February, despite an on-going criminal investigation of Loral Space and Communications and Hughes Electronics for passing to the Chinese secret information related to ballistic missile technology and guidance, President Clinton approved a national security waiver for Loral to launch one of its satellites on a Chinese rocket — allowing, in effect, Loral to provide China with the same kind of information that led to the investigation in the first place. As the New York Times pointedly remarked, "instead of responding firmly" to this possible security breach, "the White House has all but endorsed" it. Why the president issued this waiver over the objections of Justice and State (or, for that matter, why the administration is pushing to lift the requirement for launch waivers altogether) has yet to be adequately explained. Certainly the Clinton Administration's history of placing political and commercial interests above those of national security invites Congressional inquiry.

This is quite a record. It turns out that in the Clinton Administration's hands the policy of "constructive engagement" requires abandoning our non-proliferation standards, turning our back on human rights, ignoring the slow demise of the rule of law and democracy in Hong Kong, appeasing China over long-time ally and democratic Taiwan, and selling America's long-term security for immediate political and commercial advantage.

So far, Congress has done nothing to correct the administration's policies. Presumably, the Senate and the House understand that China’s practice of releasing (and exiling) a leading political prisoner in the weeks leading up to or following a summit cannot be the sum total of a policy’s substantive results. With President Clinton headed to China in June, perhaps Congress should remember that it, too, has some responsibility for American foreign policy and national security.