March 8, 2001

MEMORANDUM TO: OPINION LEADERS

FROM: THOMAS DONNELLY, Deputy Director

SUBJECT: Margaret Thatcher

Though it has been more than a decade since she stepped down as prime minister of Great Britain, Margaret Thatcher’s spirit as a champion of liberty remains as vigorous as ever, and her grasp of the opportunities and challenges facing the world’s democracies is unsurpassed. 

Both these talents were impressively displayed in a speech she gave last Thursday (March 1, 2001) to the Royal United Services Institute.  Though addressed to a British audience, her words speak to Americans -- and a new U.S.administration -- struggling to define its place and how to use its power in a new century.  In the United States, as in Great Britain, “in peacetime it is difficult for the nation to imagine our likely needs in war,” she said.  “There is a tendency for defense spending to fall to dangerously low levels; for strategic thinking to time-warp; for unrealistic ideas about how armed forces should be organized to take root.”

Moreover, Lady Thatcher cautioned, in today’s globalized world “the public is encouraged in its sense of security by a body of expert opinion which suggests that political and economic change make future wars unlikely, even impossible.  In the Global Village peace will reign between the neighbors.” “All these temptations,” she concluded, “must be resisted.”

An edited version of the speech is attached.

Speech To The Royal United Services Institute
On Receiving the Chesney Gold Medal

Margaret Thatcher
March 1, 2001

In peacetime, war is regarded by many as too remote a possibility to merit much consideration. During such periods, the case for defense-preparedness is more difficult but it has to be made. Today, there is an additional factor: the public is encouraged in its sense of security by a body of expert opinion which suggests that political and economic change make future wars unlikely, even impossible. In the Global Village, peace will reign between the neighbors. Or so we're told.

Such factors help explain the low levels of defense expenditure in many European countries. They also account for the lack of realism in much of the debate about security issues.
But let me turn to current threats.

Iraq

Recently, British airmen have been engaged over Iraq. I strongly support that U.S.-British action. Saddam Hussein counts as unfinished business. He is neither manageable nor, in the long term, containable. He has to be removed. It is because he himself knows this that Saddam will never ease up his pressure on us. We for our part can hardly expect otherwise. Saddam knows the score - - even if some of our more faint-hearted allies don't.

Not to have responded to Saddam’s attacks on our aircraft would have been seen by him as a sign of weakness. Failure to act would almost certainly have been followed by further provocation. Like all political strongmen who rule by force and fear, he must constantly demonstrate his strength -- or perish.
Having just attended the tenth anniversary of the liberation of Kuwait, and having heard the latest information, I am convinced that present policies should not be weakened. On the contrary, they must be strengthened. Let's remember that Saddam has only recently renewed his spurious claim to Kuwait. And let's not forget either how much mischief he can do in that strategically vital but politically fragile region.

Missile Defense

The perceived erosion, over the last few years, of international cooperation to control Saddam may well have encouraged others to think that the West can be defied, even by a defeated minor power. At the same time, the ability of such powers to acquire the technology to build weapons of mass destruction, and to target them by ballistic missiles against our forces, our allies, and even our cities, has grown alarmingly. That is why the creation of a system of global missile defense is a matter of urgent necessity.

As you will have gathered, I do not share the widespread nostalgia for the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. Far from regarding it as a cornerstone of stability -- to use the well-worn cliché -- I view it as an outmoded relic. Its principal architect, Henry Kissinger, has acknowledged as much.

On this side of the Atlantic, there is a tendency to suggest that the problem of proliferation can be solved by diplomatic means and by control regimes designed to halt the flow of military technology. The possibilities of controlling proliferation by such means were always much slimmer than the optimists thought. Now they are all but a dead letter.

To me, it is strange that European states have so enthusiastically lined up with Russia and China in opposing America’s plans for a system of missile defense -- plans which would increase our safety. We should, in fact, be particularly keen to see ourselves included within a truly global system.

The last U.S. Administration’s plans did not offer that, and would have therefore left us exposed. So I applaud the vision of President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld in seeking to create a missile shield which would protect America's allies and our deployed forces, as well as the American homeland. I hope that America’s European allies can now jolt themselves from their mood of grumpy isolationism. We need global missile defense.

NATO & EU

This brings me to a further area of concern: the plans for a European Rapid Reaction Force. This is a matter, I know, on which friends may differ. But it is surely cause for concern that the understanding of what is proposed varies so enormously. Indeed, the public could be forgiven for thinking that there are two plans: one for strengthening NATO, and one for creating a rival organization to it.

My own view is that if the Europeans truly wish to improve their NATO contribution they can show it simply enough. They can increase defense expenditure. They can move more swiftly to establish professional armed forces like those of the United Kingdom. And they can acquire more advanced technology. Indeed, unless that happens soon, the gulf between European and U.S. capabilities will yawn so wide that it will not be possible to share the same battlefield.

Conclusion

I conclude where I began: in peacetime it is difficult for the nation to imagine our likely needs in war. At such times, there is a tendency for defense spending to fall to dangerously low levels; for strategic thinking to remain in a time-warp; and for unrealistic ideas about how armed forces should be organized to take root. All these temptations must be resisted.