June 21, 2001

MEMORANDUM TO: OPINION LEADERS

FROM: WILLIAM KRISTOL

SUBJECT: Defense

In testimony today before the congressional armed services committees, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld lays out the five principles that will guide the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review: assure friends and allies; dissuade potential enemies from developing threatening capabilities; deterring adversaries from using force; defending the United States and its allies; and, when necessary, decisively defeating an adversary "at the time, place and manner of our choosing."

This approach correctly appreciates America's global military responsibilities: "The security and stability that the U.S. armed forces provide is the critical underpinning of peace and prosperity." But even as he embraces the goal of continued American military preeminence, Rumsfeld confesses he cannot yet translate that mandate into a coherent plan for U.S. forces or defense budgets. Instead, much of his testimony is given over to a critique of the "two-war standard" that has shaped Pentagon planning through the post-Cold-War period. Though he concedes that "in the decade since the two-[war] approach was fashioned, we have not had two major regional wars -- which, of course, is good and may well be an indication of the success of the approach" -- Rumsfeld makes his intention to replace the two-war standard clear. "The current strategy is not working," he contends.

Yet Rumsfeld's critique of the two-war standard essentially boils down to a summary of the problems caused by a decade of reduced defense spending:

o "Because we have underfunded and overused our forces," he notes, there are shortages of personnel, airlift, weaponry of all kinds, creating an "erosion in the capability of the force [that] means that the risks that we would face today and tomorrow are notably higher."

o The morale of the force has been diminished and the quality of military life degraded: "We have skimped on our people, doing harm to their trust and confidence as well as to the stability of our force."

o Thanks to cuts in procurement and research funding, Rumsfeld acknowledges that technological modernization and innovation has slowed to the point where "we have failed to invest adequately in the advanced military technologies we will need to meet the emerging threats of the new century."

o "We have not addressed the growing institutional risks," Rumsfeld says. In addition to inefficiencies such as excess bases and infrastructure, U.S. forces abroad are poorly positioned to respond to today's crises and emerging threats -- in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf or in East Asia.

o Finally, the two-war approach "focuses military planning on the near term," naturally placing the emphasis on today's responsibilities "to the detriment of preparing for longer- term threats."

But these are really complaints about the inadequacy of defense resources, not the inadequacy of the two-war standard itself. Rumsfeld cannot offer a substitute for the two-war standard, but can only say that "we owe it to ourselves to ask the question: what might be better?"

That fact is the two-war standard has stood the test of the turbulent past decade. As Michele Flournoy, an assistant defense secretary during the Clinton Administration and leader of the Pentagon team preparing for the defense review, told Congress: "Any new [force-sizing] criteria should maintain the ability of the United States military to conduct major combat operations in more than one theater at a time….To do otherwise would be to forsake U.S. leadership and risk U.S. preeminence."

Rumsfeld is correct to spotlight the new missions the military faces: the panoply of "constabulary" missions such as those in the Balkans; the need to defend the United States, its forces and allies against ballistic missiles tipped with weapons of mass destruction; the job of transforming conventional forces to exploit the "revolution in military affairs" and new technologies. But the correct way to meet these new missions is to create new capabilities, not to sacrifice today's large-war capabilities in their place.

Unfortunately, it appears increasingly that this is the devil's bargain that the Bush Administration is willing to accept, because it cannot or will not pay the costs of an adequate defense. The president, Rumsfeld says, is willing to "forego certain advantages during his presidency, so that his successors will have the new capabilities that will be needed…in more dangerous times." But the "certain advantages" Americans enjoy today begin with a historically unprecedented global, great-power peace and prosperity. It is the president's job to protect and preserve these advantages, not risk them. And it is his job and responsibility to ask for the resources necessary for today and tomorrow.