October 31, 2001

MEMORANDUM TO: OPINION LEADERS

FROM: TOM DONNELLY, Deputy Executive Director

SUBJECT: War on Terrorism

Yesterday, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld admitted that a "very modest" number of U.S. ground troops were already in Afghanistan and that the Pentagon "had not ruled out" a future large-scale ground campaign against the Taliban and Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda. In doing so, The Bush Administration has avoided the fundamental mistake made by Bill Clinton in Kosovo when he stated in advance that he would not use ground forces.

But a decade's worth of neglect and downsizing of U.S. ground forces has made the decision to use significant ground forces in Afghanistan a riskier proposition than it should be -- especially if this is to be "Phase One" in a larger war that might include decisive action against Iraq.

At less than 475,000, today's active-duty Army is a shadow of its Gulf War self. In 1991, the Army had more than 900,000 soldiers on active duty. Though the Marine Corps has avoided such draconian manpower cuts -- today there are about 172,000 active Marines compared to just under 200,000 a decade ago -- its effort to modernize its equipment has all but stopped. Adequately rebuilding the Army, adding 50,000 soldiers to the active-duty roster and equipping them, would require approximately a 20 percent rise in the Army budget, about $15 billion per year in addition to the current $70 billion. Fleshing out the Marine Corps, chronically short of infantry, might require an additional 10,000 personnel; accelerating Marine modernization would cost approximately $5 billion per year.

While the size of the ground force needed to win in Afghanistan and Iraq depends on many factors, there is no doubt that both campaigns would involve large forces with significant firepower, mobility and the staying power to maintain stability long after the fighting was concluded. Light infantry is key in Afghanistan, heavy forces in Iraq, and large heliborne forces in both.

Over the past decade, discussions of defense requirements have focused far too narrowly on the issues of force "transformation." But now we are caught in a campaign in Afghanistan and, in time, a larger war in the Persian Gulf that demands the sustained projection of land forces in large numbers. Unless we bolster American land power -- and begin to do so now, in time to make a difference -- we may deprive ourselves of the capabilities needed to win this war on terrorism decisively and without putting our other security interests in the world at risk.