July 21, 2003

MEMORANDUM TO: OPINION LEADERS

FROM: GARY SCHMITT

SUBJECT: Bush's Credibility & Iraq's WMD

Last Friday, the Bush Administration declassified sections of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's WMD Programs. From the news and media accounts of the released document, especially that of the Washington Post, one would have gotten the impression that the NIE further reinforced the view that the White House had oversold the intelligence on which President Bush's decision to go to war with Iraq was based. Nothing could be further from the truth.

According to the NIE, the American intelligence community had "High Confidence" in the following key judgments:

  • "Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding, its chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs contrary to UN resolutions."

  • "Iraq possesses proscribed chemical and biological weapons and missiles."

  • "Iraq could make a nuclear weapon in months to a year once it acquires sufficient weapons-grade material."

The only dissent from these views came from the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (INR). But, even so, this "alternative view" stated that "Saddam continues to want nuclear weapons and that available evidence indicates that Baghdad is pursuing a limited effort to maintain and acquire nuclear weapons-related capabilities." Moreover, it appears INR had no significant objection to the other key judgments and findings in the NIE with respect to Iraq's chemical, biological or missile programs.

Any fair reading of this document would lead one to conclude that: the consensus within American intelligence was that Saddam and his regime were in clear violation of UN resolutions and pursuing programs that no president could fail to consider a threat to the region and, potentially, the United States.

If, upon inspection, the NIE's judgments were unwarranted, the fault will rest not with the president's reading of the intelligence judgments but with the failure of American intelligence to provide the quantity and quality of information a president needs - and should expect.