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June 22, 2000 MEMORANDUM
TO: OPINION
LEADERS FROM:
WILLIAM
KRISTOL SUBJECT: Israel Reports out of Israel
indicate that the Clinton Administration is pushing for a Camp David-like
summit between President Clinton, Israel’s Prime Minister Ehud Barak,
and Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat shortly after the July
4th holiday. Looking to pocket a foreign policy “success” before
leaving office, the Clinton White House is pushing Israel to be “flexible”
in its negotiations with the Palestinians on a permanent-status agreement. In this connection, we draw your attention to the following memorandum by Dore Gold, Israel’s former ambassador to the United Nations and president of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. Ambassador Gold raises serious questions about the wisdom of the territorial concessions apparently being offered by the Barak government on the Jordan Valley, and, in turn, about the administration’s apparent urging of Israel to give up this strategic barrier which has served the cause of peace.
For three decades,
Israeli foreign ministers from Abba Eban through Ariel Sharon have insisted
before the international community that Israel could not withdraw in the
West Bank to the vulnerable 1967 lines from which it was attacked at the
start of the Six Day War. The great diplomatic victory of November 1967
was the language of UN Security Council Resolution 242 that legitimized
Israel’s call for “secure borders.” It was Israel’s
foreign minister under the first Rabin government, Yigal Allon, who specified
what “secure borders” meant in the pages of Foreign Affairs
in October 1976. Allon, one of Israel’s greatest military minds,
argued that Israel would need to preserve a strategic zone in the eastern
West Bank running up from the Jordan Valley to the eastern slopes of the
West Bank hill ridge. This area would allow
Israel’s small standing army to hold off an assault from a combination
of Arab states to Israel’s east for enough time for Israel to mobilize
and deploy its reserve forces, which constitute the bulk of Israel's military
power. For “secure borders” Allon envisioned that Israel would
need some 700 square miles of the 2100 square miles that make up the West
Bank (about one-third). Allon’s thinking guided the peace plans of
both Labor and Likud governments: Rabin described his goals before the
Knesset in 1995 in terms that closely resembled the ideas of Allon, who
was both his mentor and his former commander in 1948; while Benjamin Netanyahu
described, in 1997, his ideas on the final status of the territory to
be divided between Israel and the Palestinians as “Allon-Plus.” The “Allon Plan”
was originally conceived when Middle Eastern armies were relatively small
and consisted of largely slow infantry formations. All this has changed
of course. The forces Israel may have to face in the field are now larger
and mechanized. In addition, states such as Iraq or Syria, by utilizing
ballistic missiles against Israel’s civilian rear, could seriously
delay Israel’s ability to mobilize its critical reserve forces. This
only increases the importance of superior topographical conditions and
secure borders for Israel`s small standing army. But indications are
that this cornerstone of Israeli policy and diplomacy is about to go down
the drain, as the current U.S. administration attempts to organize a three-way
summit between Prime Minister Ehud Barak, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and
President Clinton in Washington in the weeks ahead. According to authoritative
leaks from the negotiations that have taken place over the past weeks,
amplified recently by Interior Minister Natan Sharansky in a letter to
Prime Minister Barak, Israel is about to concede the strategic barrier
of the Jordan Valley in order to close a deal with the PLO. Instead of
seeking at least a third of the West Bank, Israel may settle for less
than ten percent. Why? Well, it appears that Israel is considering an alternative strategic concept, by which its valuable territorial defenses are being exchanged not for peace (few trust Arafat’s intentions), but for the promise of more US foreign aid and advanced American technology to put in place an array of high-tech sensors and military systems for ensuring Israel’s security. Instead of “land for peace,” the new model for Israel’s security could be called “land for cash.”
Second, if Israel
is going to move to a “high-tech, high maintenance” defense
posture as a substitute for the Jordan Valley, who is going to pay for
it? The Cold War has ended, and with that has come a growing reluctance
on the part of the United States to support large foreign aid budgets.
Even if, for the sake of argument, one believed that advanced technology
could replace the security provided by the Jordan Valley over the long
term, is it safe to assume that the U.S. Congress will be interested in
providing the substantial aid necessary to erect and maintain this high-tech
system of defenses in the years ahead, long after the tables and chairs
on the White House lawn have been folded and the signing ceremonies forgotten? Third, Israel needs
advanced American technology, regardless of the peace process. Missile
proliferation is accelerating in Iran and probably in Iraq. The U.S. and
Israel should be working together on ballistic missile defense, whether
through the Arrow program, the anti-Katyusha laser, or boost-phase options.
Neutralizing the missile threat is in both nations’ strategic interests
and should not be tied to the peace process. Nor should the costs associated
with implementing a peace agreement drain resources away from these other
critical defense programs. What should then be
done? Peace is important to all Israelis. But Israel needs a secure peace.
And what Israel needs more than extra cash is firm U.S. diplomatic support
for its long-held territorial positions. What Israel needs is secure borders.
It is important to remember that while the US sometimes positions itself
as a neutral facilitator of the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians,
ultimately, the U.S. is Israel’s ally. But when the parties are in
the tunnel of negotiations, American diplomats may believe that it is
imperative to get the parties to modify their positions to ensure the
continuation of the negotiating process and to bolster hopes for a final
accord. Since the signing
of the Oslo Accords in 1993, Israel has adjusted its positions to Palestinians
needs. What is needed in this last push to a “final status”
agreement is a Palestinian adjustment to Israeli needs. More important
than any peace agreement is an arrangement on the ground that leaves Israel
confident about its own security, both today and in the years ahead. An
agreement that falls short of that goal is likely to produce an Israel
that is more dependent on the United States, more concerned with the slightest
change in the policies of neighboring states and, in turn, less confident
about its own future. Of course, Israel
is ultimately responsible for the diplomatic positions that it adopts.
But should the Clinton Administration get into the business of presenting
proposals to bridge differences between the parties and assuring the Barak
government of huge multi-year aid packages (that it cannot guarantee),
then it is also taking an active part in shaping Israel’s future.
It would then share responsibility for the outcome that is finally reached.
Ambassador Gold served as Israel’s permanent representative to the
United Nations between 1997 and 1999. He is the president of the Jerusalem
Center for Public Affairs and an adjunct scholar at the American Enterprise
Institute in Washington, DC.
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