September 6, 2001

MEMORANDUM TO: OPINION LEADERS

FROM: REUEL MARC GERECHT, Director of the Middle East Initiative

SUBJECT: Israel and the Middle East

I would like to draw your attention to today’s New York Times article, “Arabs Expect No Wider War, but Fear U.S. Coolness” by Neil MacFarquhar. The piece does a fine job, unintentionally, of underscoring why the peace process collapsed last October into violence. Mr. MacFarquhar presents the Arab case that the Holy Land became a battle zone because “Jewish settlements (had) expanded” and Israeli control over daily Palestinian life had increased under Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Arafat balked at Camp David, even after Barak’s Let-Us-Divide-Jerusalem offer, since the Palestinian people could see on the ground that the Israelis weren’t serious; the violence continues because the Palestinian people have no hope. MacFarquhar has Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak looking into the hearts and minds of Islamic Jihad’s and Hamas’ human bombs, seeing young men driven to suicide and murder because they are trapped in their villages by Israeli restrictions and curfews, unable to find gainful employment or go to school. “So you can expect them to detonate bombs and kill themselves.” Hope will not return, MacFarquhar’s Arabs assert, unless Israel abandons the occupation of East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza, and agrees to terms guaranteeing the freedom of Palestinians and the viability of a Palestinian state. The Bush administration, by keeping its distance from Arafat, is only making the violence worse.

Myth 1: let us put an end to the settlement canard. Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza occupy less than two percent of the disputed land. Israeli settlements, like Jerusalem itself, were put on the table by Ehud Barak at Camp David. Yasir Arafat chose not to focus on these issues but rather aim at the Palestinian “right of return” -- the right of Palestinians living abroad, or in the West Bank and Gaza, to return to Israel. Barak refused Arafat’s maximalist demands since all the parties knew very well that an Israeli concession on this point would effectively extinguish the Jewish State.

True to his words for over forty years, Arafat had not abandoned the rhetorical cornerstone of the PLO, a “multi-ethnic” Palestinian state comprising all of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. MacFarquhar quotes the director of the Center of Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan who, unintentionally, reveals again the non-negotiable Palestinian position that derailed the peace process at Camp David. “Fifty years from now there will be a majority of Arabs in Israel and on the West Bank,” Mustafa Harameh, predicts. “What are they going to do then? Now is the time to say, ‘We made a mistake; we stole your land; let us see what we can do.’” Mr. Harameh’s demographics for Israel are jiggered, but his remarks reveal the spirit of the Palestinians en guerre. The Israelis really ought to give up now since they were born in sin and the Arabs will eventually get them. So why not surrender on good terms?

Myth 2: Israeli settlements prevent a Palestinian state from ever being “viable.” This is geographic nonsense. It may be true that the West Bank and Gaza aren’t ideal pieces of property that make states. But once you accept the idea that the West Bank and Gaza can make a Palestinian state (which was the operative understanding at Camp David) then it’s untenable to argue that two percent of the land could abort the enterprise.

Myth 3: Palestinian violence, particularly suicide-bombing, is provoked by Palestinian hopelessness and depression, which is primarily fueled by Israeli intransigence, especially regarding security and settlements. In fact, the vast majority of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have no contact whatsoever with Israeli settlers. Most Palestinians are still ruled (and “ruled” is the right word) by the Palestinian Authority with its 30,000-plus well-armed security and intelligence forces, which still spend more time ensuring that Arafat’s writ is obeyed in the territories than they do fighting the Israelis. Though Israeli security measures taken since Arafat unleashed his security units and the fundamentalists are no doubt painful to Palestinians, they are hardly inhuman. Nor are they are particularly effective. If they were, and if the Israeli methods were as awful as Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and his foreign minister say they are (the constant “killing of men, women, children, and elder’s”), Israel would not now be plagued by almost daily Palestinian attacks inside Israel. Mubarak, who knows something about squashing violent fundamentalist movements, could well advise the Israelis on what are truly draconian and effective security measures against fearless, messianic types. Ditto for the other Arab leaders who now regularly upbraid the Israelis for “brutality.”

This ought to be obvious: the militants who are now blowing themselves up to smite their foes are not doing so because the peace process has faltered. Islamic Jihad and Hamas do not want the peace process at all. They aren’t upset by the way things have turned out. They certainly are not killing themselves because they are depressed. They are, as holy warriors, euphoric. When one reads the Palestinian press, or listens to the speeches of its leaders, or scans the PLO’s Fatah website, one doesn’t get the impression that Yasir Arafat, or the Palestinian people, feel like they are losing. They sense the fear and hesitancy on the other side. After all, Arafat now has a guerrilla army of 30,000 men right next to Israel. Far more effectively than before, Palestinian militants can strike Israelis in downtown Tel Aviv.

The Israelis could actually do unto Mr. Arafat as King Hussein did in September, 1970, when the PLO tried to provoke a civil war in Jordan. The Arab press and Arab television regularly now charge the Israelis with “Palestinian massacres,” yet the Israelis have not even come close to the 5,000 death toll that King Hussein racked up in his successful effort to stop the PLO from turning Jordan into a Arafat-controlled Palestinian guerrilla state. Israel isn’t of course permitted to play by Arab rules. Israel’s tactics -- targetted killing of Palestinian extremists, the use of helicopters, quick tactical ground insertions -- have so far aimed at minimizing Palestinian and Israeli casualties. Whether these tactics can, however, be sufficiently effective remains to be seen.