March 19, 2002

MEMORANDUM TO: OPINION LEADERS

FROM: GARY SCHMITT

SUBJECT: North Korea

Yesterday, in remarks before an audience in Missouri, President Bush reiterated his State of the Union statement that an “axis of evil” exists in the world. Coincidently, the New York Times today (James Brooke, “One German, and His North Korean Conscience,” p.A4) reports on the efforts of a German physician to bring to the world’s attention just how evil one member of that axis -- North Korea -- is. Norbert Vollertsen, who spent a year and half in North Korea as a doctor, witnessed truly massive and extraordinary human rights abuses by the government, including Pyongyang deliberately starving regions of the country in order to eliminate supposedly disloyal citizens and then cynically using the photographs of the suffering population to elicit more food assistance from abroad.

As James Doran, of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee professional staff, has written in the current Weekly Standard (“”), the only lasting solution to ending this state of affairs is to remove Kim Jong II’s Stalinist regime from power. “Assuming and undergirding the legitimacy of a regime so plainly illegitimate as Kim Jong II’s is not only contrary to American values but also doomed to fail, just as detente and arms control with the Soviet Union failed in the 1970s.” In place of the current policy of engagement with Pyongyang, Doran recommends that the United States and its allies adopt a series of specific policies designed to undermine the regime. The full article follows.

Axis of Evil, Asian Division
Jim Doran
The Weekly Standard
March 25, 2002

President Bush's inclusion of North Korea in the "axis of evil" was accurate and necessary. It was also liberating. It freed us from the confines of a debate about North Korea that has unfolded along traditional hawk versus dove lines.

The doves, led by South Korean president Kim Dae Jung and former U.S. president Bill Clinton, stressed the need for dialogue, conciliation, and the pursuit of signed agreements with the North. This approach has featured the 1994 Agreed Framework, a North-South summit in June 2000, renewed diplomatic relations between Pyongyang and several Western countries (though not the United States), and the lifting of longstanding U.S. sanctions on North Korea.

If the measure of success is the enhancement of U.S. and South Korean security, then the dovish approach has manifestly failed. Through all the talk and signing ceremonies of the past decade, North Korea has continued to develop the Taepo Dong-2 missile, which will be able to reach the United States, according to the CIA. It also continues to export missile components and technology to Iran, Libya, and Syria. No effort has been made to diminish its stock of chemical and biological weapons, both of which, the CIA recently informed Congress, Pyongyang has the capability to deliver by missile. As for nuclear power, despite the freeze on construction of the Yongbyon nuclear reactors, the fact is that without full inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to which North Korea has agreed but which have yet to take place, we simply do not know the full extent of Pyongyang's nuclear capabilities.

Meanwhile, the readiness of North Korea's massive conventional army -- third largest in the world, for a country with 22 million people -- has improved over the past few years after a famine-induced slide in the mid-1990s, largely thanks to aid from the United States and South Korea. As a result, the regime in North Korea is as entrenched and dangerous today as it was when we launched Asia's analogue to the now-defunct Middle East peace process.

In pointing out these failures, hawks have argued for verifiability and strict reciprocity in agreements, immediate IAEA access to North Korea, and an exploration of the possibility of replacing the nuclear reactors being built for North Korea under the Agreed Framework with conventional power plants.

While the hawks' goals are desirable, their approach suffers no less than the doves' from a fundamental flaw: It assumes the legitimacy of the Communist regime in Pyongyang. Indeed, as long as we continue to negotiate with North Korea over what are essentially technical matters, however hard-headed our negotiating posture, we contribute to the legitimacy of the regime. Assuming and undergirding the legitimacy of a regime so plainly illegitimate as Kim Jong Il's is not only contrary to American values but also doomed to fail, just as detente and arms control with the Soviet Union failed in the 1970s.

President Bush has pointed the way out of this box. By properly labeling the North Korean regime evil, the president has called into question its legitimacy. This allows us to get to the heart of the matter: Getting rid of Kim Jong Il and the sinister clique in Pyongyang is the only lasting solution to the multiple threats that North Korea now poses to the world.

A liberation strategy for North Korea would require at least the following policies:

(1) Public diplomacy. The president's State of the Union speech should be followed up with additional statements by high-ranking officials that indicate the United States' desire for a new regime in Pyongyang. In order to keep the moral high ground, Washington must offer reasons that focus not only on the North Korean military threat, but also on the execrable human rights situation. North Korea is routinely ranked among the very worst offenders in the world by all the monitoring organizations.

Radio Free Asia broadcasting into North Korea, now just 2 hours a day, should be ramped up -- ultimately to 24 hours a day -- in conjunction with efforts to provide and spread the means of communication in North Korea, as was done successfully in Poland in the early 1980s. Obviously, the United States should oppose additional moves toward extending diplomatic recognition to Pyongyang and including North Korea in international fora.

(2) End financial subsidies to the regime. U.S., South Korean, and international aid legitimizes the North Korean regime, helps sustain its military capabilities, and in all likelihood saved it from collapse in the early to mid-1990s. North Korea has diverted U.S.-provided fuel oil for military purposes. We cannot be sure where our food aid has gone because the inspection regime is a farce: Aid groups must give the government a week's notice before inspecting distribution systems.

The United States should end this silly state of affairs by giving North Korea a short deadline to allow no-notice, countrywide inspections of food aid and fuel oil distribution. If the deadline is not met (which seems likely), the aid should be cut off. Similarly, if North Korea does not allow the full IAEA inspections required under the Agreed Framework to begin immediately, construction of the lightwater reactors should cease forthwith. Diplomatic pressure should also be brought to bear on Beijing and Seoul to cease the direct aid and payoffs that have marked their recent policies toward Pyongyang. Finally, the United States should declare that there will be no further lifting of sanctions and that all international loans to North Korea will be opposed.

(3) Encourage an exodus from North Korea. A flood of refugees from the former East Germany contributed to the welcome collapse of that regime in 1989. There are credible reports that over 200,000 North Koreans have fled in recent years to China, Russia, and South Korea.

We should encourage this trend by providing diplomatic and financial support to South Korean-based refugee organizations, international nongovernmental organizations, and governments that are willing to assist those who flee the prison that is North Korea. Such an effort would be an act of true international mercy, as opposed to the present charade of providing food aid that is "distributed" by the North Korean military.

(4) Promote internal opposition. This can be pursued through both overt and covert means. Radio Free Asia broadcasting and public diplomacy should stress the benefits of freedom and democracy for the people of North Korea.

On the covert side, defectors and refugees can help identify and establish contact with potential allies within the North Korean government. It can be communicated to these people that the United States would urge their receiving amnesty in a post-Communist North Korea and would seek punishment only for Kim Jong Il and the worst abusers of human rights.

(5) Sustain and enhance deterrence. Until North Korea is free, it must continually be reminded that aggressive action on its part will immediately result not in mere retaliation, but in a decisive blow that will end the regime. The Bush administration's inclusion of North Korea as a potential target in the recent Nuclear Posture Review is an excellent step in that direction. Addressing the grossly inadequate housing and unfair pay scale for our soldiers in Korea would also help.

A policy geared toward the ultimate liberation of North Korea will require time, effort, and expense. Most of all, it will require fortitude. For that reason, it will be opposed by the guardians of the status quo. But as the horrible events of September 11 should have made clear, the status quo is no longer acceptable.