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MEMORANDUM
TO:
OPINION LEADERS FROM:
GARY SCHMITT SUBJECT: North Korea This Monday, Assistant
Secretary of State James Kelly will hold talks in San Francisco with diplomats
from South Korea and Japan. The issue: whether to continue the Clinton-era
policy of engagement with North Korea. The core element of
that policy has been the 1994 Agreed Framework in which the U.S. and South
Korea provide North Korea with two new nuclear reactors in exchange for
the North freezing its nuclear-weapons program, a program in violation
of its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. At bottom,
the question is whether the Bush Administration will allow a policy of
nuclear blackmail to continue to guide American statecraft for this charter
member of the “axis of evil.” In this connection,
I would like to draw your attention to the recent letter sent to President
Bush by three leading figures in the U.S. House of Representatives: House
Policy Chairman Christopher Cox (R-CA), Chairman of the International
Relations South Asia Subcommittee Ben Gilman (R-NY), and Chairman of the
Bipartisan Nonproliferation Task Force Rep. Edward Markey (D-MA). The
principal request they make is that the administration stop approving
transfers of U.S. nuclear know-how to North Korea until that government
allows full and unhindered nuclear inspections and, in turn, is found
in compliance with its treaty commitments. The letter follows.
May 31, 2002 The Honorable George
W. Bush Re: North Korea Dear Mr. President: We appreciate the
careful consideration you gave to the points made in our letter to you
dated February 5, 2002, regarding North Korea. We particularly welcome
the conclusion you drew in Presidential Determination 2002-12 of April
1, 2002, that the facts do not permit you to certify that North Korea
is complying with all provisions of the Agreed Framework of 1994. In view
of that Presidential Determination, as well as other facts that are now
emerging, we believe there are a number of additional steps that the Administration
should immediately undertake with respect to North Korea. The Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization (KEDO) anticipates that it will begin
pouring the foundation of the first light water reactor this August and
will complete a significant portion of the reactor project in 36 months.
Meanwhile, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) says that, even
with full cooperation from North Korea, it will need at least 36 months
to determine if North Korea is in compliance with its nuclear safeguards
obligations. Clearly, with North Korea continuing to refuse to open itself
up to full nuclear inspections, construction of the reactor should not
proceed. The National Intelligence
Council stated in its 2001 report to Congress entitled “Foreign Missile
Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015” that
“The Intelligence Community judged in the mid-l990s that North Korea
had produced one, possibly two, nuclear weapons.” Obviously the conclusion
that North Korea likely has produced nuclear weapons implies the conclusion
that North Korea has in the past maintained a covert program to produce
such weapons. The combination of this fact with recent reports that North
Korea is currently operating a covert uranium processing facility should
raise U.S. concerns that North Korea is continuing to operate a covert
nuclear weapons program contrary to the intent of the Agreed Framework.
Given these concerns, we believe three actions should be immediately undertaken to ensure that progress on the North Korean nuclear reactor construction does not get ahead of Pyongyang’s compliance with the inspection requirements of the Agreed Framework. These steps are: 1. Instructing the U.S. representative to KEDO’s executive board to advise KEDO that America’s first priority is to make sure that the construction of nuclear reactors in North Korea does not get ahead of IAEA efforts to assure that North Korea is in full compliance with its safeguards obligations. To this end, the U.S. board member should object to pouring by KEDO of nuclear reactor foundations in North Korea prior to agreement by North Korea to initiation of the IAEA inspections called for in the Agreed Framework. 2. Completing an intelligence assessment of the IAEA’s ability to ferret out all of North Korea’s possible nuclear weapons-related materials and activities during the three-year course of inspections currently planned by the IAEA. Such assessments have been made in the case of Iraq with regard to UNSCOM and UNMOVIC inspections. We believe that at least as much should be done with regard to North Korea, and it should be done before nuclear reactor construction begins in earnest with the pouring of concrete foundations this August. 3. Discontinuing immediately all U.S. Department of Energy transfers of U.S. nuclear technology to North Korea. Such transfers might be only questionable were Pyongyang to be judged compliant with the Agreed Framework, but the policy is entirely unsound given that North Korea is not in compliance. We certainly cannot ask Russia to stop training Iranians to operate light water reactors when we continue to do so with a nation which, unlike Iran, is in clear violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Moreover, following the attacks of September 11th, the U.S. government has restricted access by U.S. citizens to information regarding nuclear reactor safety and operation. In light of this precaution, it is difficult to justify sharing that same information with a government in North Korea that may have a covert weapons program, is listed as a state sponsor of terrorism, and still refuses nuclear inspections. Taking these steps
now is essential to buttressing the IAEA in its efforts to begin the nuclear
inspections required under the Agreed Framework. These steps also will
ensure that U.S. policy does not inadvertently help North Korea develop
nuclear weapons. Again, we appreciate
the care with which you have approached this issue, and look forward to
continuing to work with you on it. Sincerely, Edward
J. Markey
Christopher
Cox
Benjamin
A. Gilman
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