|
|
|
|
|
William
Kristol Since the end of World
War II, the United States has regarded the al-Saud regime as a friend,
or an ally, or at least a partner for stability in the Middle East. After
September 11, it is time to call this assumption into question. It is
time for the United States to rethink its relationship with Riyadh. For
we are now at war -- at war with terror and its sponsor, radical Islam.
And in this war, the Saudi regime is more part of the problem than part
of the solution The case for reevaluating
our strategic partnership with the current Saudi regime is a strong one.
Begin with the simple fact that 15 of the 19 participants in the September
11 attacks were Saudi nationals. That’s something the Saudis themselves
could not initially admit. A large proportion -- perhaps as high as 80
percent, according to some reports -- of the “detainees” taken
from Afghanistan to Guantanamo Bay are Saudis. And although Osama bin
Laden has made much of his antipathy to the Saudi regime, his true relationship
with the royal family is certainly more complex and questionable. The
Saudis refused, despite the urgings of the Clinton Administration, to
take him into custody in 1996 when Sudan offered to deliver him. The Saudis also have
been deeply implicated in the wave of suicide bombers that have attacked
Israeli citizens, and American citizens in Israel, in recent years. Again,
initial Saudi official reaction has been to deny the link. Even as documents
captured by Israel in its spring offensive against the Palestinian Authority
revealed the Saudi role, the kingdom’s ambassador to the United States
denounced as “baseless” any suggestion that Saudi money “goes
to evildoers.” The Israelis, Prince Bandar complained, were engaged
in a “shameful and counterproductive” attempt to discredit his
family “which has been a leading voice for peace.” The charge
“that Saudi Arabia is paying suicide bombers” is “totally
false,” he said. The prince’s
claim is proven false not simply by the documents discovered by Israel
but by the Saudi government’s own press releases. One from January
2001 boasts how the “Saudi Committee for Support of the Al-Quds Intifada,”
headed and administered by Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz, the kingdom’s
interior minister, has distributed $33 million to “deserving Palestinians”
including “the families of 2,281 prisoners and 358 martyrs.”
Other releases from subsequent months detailed further payments to Palestinian
“martyrs” totaling tens of millions of dollars. Public announcements
in Palestinian newspapers have given instructions on how to receive payments
from the intifada committee. And the documents make clear the close connection
between the Saudis and the terrorist Hamas organization in particular. It has taken something
like willful ignorance on the part of successive American administrations
to ignore such developments or explain them away, and to maintain the
fiction that the Saudis are our “strategic partners.” Clinton
National Security Adviser Sandy Berger lamented -- once safely out of
office -- that “the veil has been lifted [from over U.S.-Saudi relations]
and the American people see a double game they’re not terribly pleased
with.” Brent Scowcroft, always cautious, admitted, “We [Americans
and Saudis] probably avoid talking about the things that are the real
problems between us because it¹s a very polite relationship. We don’t
get all that much below the surface.” Former Secretary of State George
Shultz bluntly terms the traditional U.S.-Saudi relationship “a grotesque
protection racket.” Clearly, the long
tradition of quiet diplomacy with the Saudi monarchy no longer serves
American purposes. The royal family has taken silence as consent in its
strategy of directing Arab and Islamic discontent away from the House
of Saud and toward the United States, Israel and the West. This is a strategy
inimical to American security and a dangerously crippling problem in President
Bush’s war on terrorism. The first step in
fashioning a realistic American policy toward Saudi Arabia is understanding
the nature of the Saudi regime. We should begin by a public, detailed
and thorough investigation -- perhaps initiated by this committee -- into
the Saudi role in the events of September 11. This should be a broad investigation,
addressing the ideological preparation, financing and recruitment of terrorists
eager to commit suicidal attacks. Congress should not be deterred in this
by any concurrent investigations by the Justice Department. Public knowledge can
then be the basis for public diplomacy. Only by applying pressure can
we encourage whatever modernizing movement there may be within the royal
family and the armed forces while isolating the radical Wahhabi clerics
and their supporters. Prince Abdullah is sometimes seen as a reformer.
We should give him every incentive to reform the current Saudi regime,
and the main such incentive would be to tell him, privately and publicly,
that the status quo is unacceptable. Beyond speaking truth
to the House of Saud and encouraging modernization within Saudi Arabia,
the United States should demand that the Saudis stop financing and encouraging
radical and extreme Wahhabism, beginning with mosques and charities in
the United States but extending also throughout the Islamic world, including
Pakistan, Afghanistan and other trouble spots. Given its role in providing
a breeding ground for anti-American terror, the export of Wahhabism is
a clear and present danger to the United States and its citizens. In general,
we must make clear that the Saudis can no longer play both sides of the
fence. What President Bush has demanded of others -- to cut off all support
for terrorists and to stand with the United States -- applies also to
Saudi Arabia. At the same time,
it is clear that we cannot base our strategy for the region on the hope
that the Saudis will moderate their behavior to suit our interests. To
the Saudis we have been, at best, allies of convenience, shielding them
from other would-be regional hegemons with greater conventional military
strength, larger populations and more diverse economies. The Saudi desire
to create a caliphate of money and religious extremism depends upon an
unwitting American partner. So in addition to
hoping for and encouraging change from within Saudi Arabia, we should
develop strategic alternatives to reliance on Riyadh. In the military
sphere, we have already begun to hedge, with agreements and deployments
to other Gulf emirates. Although still the strongest influence on oil
prices, other source -- in Russia, the Caspian Basin, Mexico and elsewhere
-- can be developed and brought to market at a reasonable cost. The attacks
of September 11 remind us that it is not just what we pay at the pump
but what we pay in lives, security and international political stability
that comprise the true price of Saudi oil. In particular, removing
the regime of Saddam Hussein and helping construct a decent Iraqi society
and economy would be a tremendous step toward reducing Saudi leverage.
Bringing Iraqi oil fully into world markets would improve energy economics.
From a military and strategic perspective, Iraq is more important than
Saudi Arabia. And building a representative government in Baghdad would
demonstrate that democracy can work in the Arab world. This, too, would
be a useful challenge to the current Saudi regime. In sum, we should not be attempting to preserve our past relationship with Saudi Arabia but rather forging a new approach to the greater Middle East. We have learned at great cost that Persian Gulf dictators, be they in Tehran, Baghdad or Riyadh, are shaky partners at best and cause major problems at worst. In the future we must find an alternative, either through reform in Saudi Arabia and/or the fostering of other relationships with truer allies, to a Saudi regime that funds and foments terror.
|
 |
   
|
