MEMORANDUM TO: OPINION LEADERS

FROM: GARY SCHMITT

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan

America’s man in Taipei, Douglas Paal, has reportedly warned Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian against holding referenda on major policy issues – such as nuclear power, or Taiwan’s admission to the World Health Organization – because doing so would cross Beijing’s red line on Taiwan. The South China Morning Post reported that Mr. Paal, the unofficial U.S. representative in Taiwan, “conveyed US opposition over the proposal to Mr. Chen last Friday on the grounds that the mainland believes once Taiwan holds a referendum, it will have gone too far in asserting its claim on independence” (“Chen Chides US for Opposing Plan to Hold Plebiscites,” Monday, June 23, 2003). This follows in the wake of two earlier demarches by Paal to Taiwan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eugene Chien (BBC, Monitoring Asia Pacific, June 23, 2003). As Agence France-Presse reported: “The U.S. is fully aware of China’s stand and has conveyed China’s stand to Taiwan’’ (“U.S. Warns Taiwan Not to Hold Referendum,” June 21, 2003).

If these reports are accurate, Mr. Paal’s representations raise a number of questions. Chief among them: why is the U.S. de facto ambassador to Taipei conveying PRC policy toward Taiwan? The unfortunate answer is that U.S. policy on Taiwan has drifted dangerously close to the mainland’s by viewing Taiwan’s democracy and efforts at self-determination as irresponsible and provocative – rather than normal and admirable for a country of 23 million that has moved from dictatorship to democracy.

Another question is, how can the U.S. oppose the exercise of democracy in Taiwan? If Taiwan is not supposed to conduct referenda on the theory that it will eventually conduct a referendum on independence, what is to keep China from insisting, and the U.S. from agreeing, that one candidate or another ought not to run, or express views about Taiwan’s future?

However, the most important question of all is how will U.S. policy on Taiwan adapt to accommodate the desire of Taiwan’s people to preserve their democracy free of mainland control? Unfortunately, U.S. policy increasingly undermines Taiwan’s efforts to gain international legitimacy: witness Washington’s weak support for Taiwan’s efforts to enter the World Health Organization and its apparent silence in the face of the World Trade Organization’s effort to downgrade Taiwan’s status within that body.

Not only do these policy decisions run contrary to the intent of the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), but they also encourage China’s leaders to view Taiwan’s separateness as temporary. As such, they reinforce Beijing’s preparations to acquire Taiwan in various ways: by encouraging Taiwan’s economic dependence, amassing military might along China’s eastern coast, and relentlessly working to isolate Taiwan internationally. All of these are designed to make Taiwan feel unification is inevitable. China of course also wants the U.S. to believe Taiwan’s unification with the mainland is inevitable. American officials, like Mr. Paal, who judge Taiwan’s efforts to gain international standing or determine their own affairs as provocative, in effect do China’s bidding. And, in doing so, these officials virtually force the democratic government of Taiwan to seek opportunities to create the political and diplomatic space it needs to reaffirm its legitimate existence internationally – creating the very crisis in cross strait relations they are supposedly trying to avoid.

The current direction of U.S. policy toward Taiwan is not only questionable morally but is strategically untenable over the longer term. It rests on a “One China” policy that is out-of-date with geo-political realities and the domestic dynamics in both China and Taiwan. The Cold War, which gave rise to the policy in the first place, is over and the Republic of China (Taiwan) no longer claims to be the government of all China. Today, Taiwan is a liberal democracy, while China remains a one-party dictatorship that maintains its legitimacy by stoking Chinese nationalist visions of a “Greater China.”

Attempting to placate Beijing on the issue of unification with Taiwan does not in fact lead to lessened tensions across the strait. To the contrary, it boosts China’s ambitions and leads them to question Washington’s willingness to defend Taiwan if necessary – a point seemingly confirmed by NSC Senior Director of Asian Affairs James Moriarty’s recent press briefing in which he stated that the U.S. will “help Taiwan to the extent possible defend itself,” a substantial weakening of President Bush’s previous pledge in 2001 to do “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself.” Finally, America’s “One China” policy was predicated upon China’s commitment to a peaceful resolution of differences with Taiwan. China’s military modernization, which is aimed at Taiwan and complicating any U.S. intervention, calls China’s commitment to a peaceful resolution into question.

Allowing Taiwan to be further isolated, while leading China to believe its “One China” policy is effectively our own, cannot help but create misunderstanding and, potentially, a confrontation in which we will be forced to intervene. What is needed is a revised U.S. policy that reassures Taiwan that unification is only possible if freely chosen by the people of Taiwan; makes clear the U.S. will resist militarily any effort by the mainland to force unification; and takes active measures to integrate Taiwan into the larger community of democratic states in Asia and the world.